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Ruminations on the Quality of Equality? 
Philip B. Kurland* 
Equality is the subject of many learned works-ancient and 
modern-no two of which are in complete accord as to its mean- 
ing or form? The concept of equality, except in mathematics, 
would appear to have no more definition than the shape of an 
amoeba. And that definition must differ depending on the time 
at which it is viewed, the perspective from which it is viewed, the 
purpose for which it is viewed, and-perhaps most impor- 
tantly-the idiosyncracies of the viewer. For, after all, equality is 
a concept that appeals to instinct rather than intellect. 
Some may observe, and with certain validity, that I address 
the problem from a nineteenth-century focus. I am reminded of 
Professor Paul Freund's comment on Mr. Justice Brandeis: 
A critic as unperceptive as he was unfriendly once remarked 
that Charles Evans Hughes possessed one of the finest minds of 
the eighteenth century. A more plausible observer might main- 
tain that Louis D. Brandeis had one of the finest minds of the 
nineteenth century. It is certain that most of the central features 
of the twentieth century were antipathetic to his view of man 
and man's potentialities. 
The twentieth century is an era of mass movements; of the 
separation of ownership from control; of impersonal and anony- 
mous corporate acts obscuring responsibility and shielding indi- 
viduals from the consequences of their failings. . . . The prob- 
lem of recognizing human fault and frailty, virtue and talent, 
in the context of giant enterprise is to be found in twentieth- 
century industry, in governmental undertakings, and in na- 
tional structures themselves. This problem was, I believe, cen- 
tral in Brandeis' thinking. To him the rise of giantism and the 
t @ 1979 by Philip B. Kurland. Based on an address presented at the Brigham Young 
University Forum Assembly, March 27, 1979. 
* William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor in The College and Profes- 
sor of Law in The Law School, The University of Chicago. 
1. See, e.g., THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY (W. Blackstone ed. 1969); A. GRIMES, EQUALITY 
IN AMERICA (1964); H. JAFFE, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY (1965); C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 0072); 
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moral dilemmas it has posed-the curse of bigness, as he was 
not ashamed to describe it-was lamentable, corrupting man's 
character, and by no means so inevitable or irredressible as is 
commonly ass~rned.~ 
Indeed, it is the curse of bigness that is central to my con- 
cerns, for it involves the necessary subversion of the individual, 
the subordination of individual rights and responsibilities to the 
group, the class, the caste, and the mass. Mass society, as our 
sociologists label it, with its gross commercial, industrial, labor, 
social, educational, and political institutions, all subjected to 
control by governments of massive bureaucracies, is the problem. 
A sterile, destructive, all-encompassing equality-or what is 
called equality-is, to me, not the solution to the evils of the mass 
society but only its consequence. Such a mass society, with egali- 
tarianism as its creed and dogma, places little worth on the indi- 
vidual, on liberty, on civility, on privacy, on culture, or on excel- 
lence-all the things that make life in society tolerable. The mass 
society represents a reversal of what Henry Maine once styled the 
movement toward individual f r e e d ~ m , ~  for we now seem to be 
going backward, from contract to status. 
There is, of course, no quarrel to be had with the worth of 
what Sir Isaiah Berlin spoke of as "the irreducible minimum ,of 
the ideal of equality": " 'Every man to count for one and no one 
to count for more than one.' "4 But that speaks of the individual 
"one"; it doesn't address the argument that every group or class 
is to count for "one" or "more than one." And, as Berlin pointed 
out, "Like many familiar phrases of political philosophy," the 
proposal to count every person as one, neither more nor less, "is 
vague, ambiguous, and has changed in connotation from one 
thinker and society to another."l 
The bicentennial of the first American Revolution was cele- 
brated in 1976. It is not clear why, since so few of its goals are 
still cherished. As with Washington's Farewell Addre~s,~ the prin- 
2. Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 177 (rev. ed. A. Dunham & P. 
Kurland 1964) (footnote omitted). 
3. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1st American ed. New York 1870) (1st ed. London 
186lf 
4. I. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 81 (1978). 
5. Id. 
6. See P .  KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 165-66 (1978); Morris, George 
Washington Farewell Address 1796, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 192 (D. Boorstin ed. 1966). 
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ciples of the Revolution are honored but their teachings are ig- 
nored. The first American Revolution was a political revolution 
asserting the right of American citizens to be their own sovereign. 
It had an element of equality in its rhetoric. For, despite the then 
well-entrenched and still unmitigated institution of slavery, Jef- 
ferson's Declaration of Independence announced-with the usual 
ambiguity of such sonorous phrases-that "all men are created 
equal. "7 
The second American revolutionthe industrialization and 
consequent urbanization of the nation-clearly incompatible 
with Jefferson's reliance on an agrarian society as the essential 
element of both liberty and equality, may never be celebrated. It 
has no fixed date of origin, nor can it be said when it ended. But 
it  has ended. This was an economic revolution-materialistic 
rather than idealistic-that made Americans among the best fed, 
best clothed, best housed, and best educated people of the  world. 
(I speak here in quantitative terms, not about haute cuisine, or 
high style, or architecture, or culture.) Surely that preeminence 
is fast fading, if it  is not already gone. 
There was an element of equality in this revolution, too, 
although it might sound strange to contemporary ears. It, too, 
demanded that equals were to be treated as equals, but also that 
unequals were to be treated differently. Thus, each person was 
entitled to take from society in goods and services the equivalent 
of that which he put in: right was measured by contribution. And 
the measure of contribution was to be found in the prices fixed 
for goods and services by the market place. Those who did not 
contribute were certainly not entitled to equal shares. Indeed, 
they were not entitled to any share a t  all, except by way of gift, 
patronage, or charity. Whether delineated as Protestant ethic or 
social Darwinism, the second revolution rested on the notion that 
property and its appurtenances were the measure of equality. Mr. 
Justice Holmes to the contrary notwith~tanding,~ Herbert Spen- 
cer's Social Statics was indeed incorporated in the fourteenth 
amendment. 
This notion of fair shares was, of course, contradictory to the 
idealized seventeenth-century notion of commonwealth and even 
more to the twentieth-century welfare state, in which an ever 
increasing number of goods and services are dispensed not by 
7. See J. SPARROW, TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING 1-23 (1977); G. WILLS, INVENTING 
AMERICA (1978). 
8. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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those who produced them but by the government which asserts 
control over them. This is the third American revolution-the 
egalitarian revolution-essentially social but encompassing the 
political and economic as well. The emphasis of the egalitarian 
revolution is on societal equality among groups or classes rather 
than among individuals. And it is equality of condition rather 
than equality of opportunity that is its goal. All classes are to be 
made equal to all other classes. But, as in Animal Farm, if "all 
animals are equal," still, "some animals are more equal than 
others,"@ and perhaps those animals that once were less equal 
than others are now to be more equal than others. It has been said 
on higher authority that "the last shall be first"lO-but not until 
the millennium. 
III 
Let me emphasize that my perspective on this question of 
equality is a narrow one. I am not a philosopher who might ex- 
plain the egalitarian revolution in a magnum opus in the name 
of "Justice." Nor am I a political theorist who would justify it in 
the name of "Truth." I do not pretend to know the real meaning 
of Justice and Truth, for these, too, are essentially instinctive or 
inspired, rather than rational, concepts. Still less am I an econo- 
mist who knows that the market rather than the government, or 
vice versa, should have primary claim to control the mechanism 
for determining distribution of all goods and services. And least 
of all am I a sociologist or political scientist, who knows how a 
society should properly be constructed. I am a narrow-gauge law- 
yer who has witnessed the current revolution "through a glass, 
darkly,"ll i. e., through the prisms afforded by the courts, legisla- 
tures, and bureaucracies-by the courts in judgments directed to 
particular cases or controversies, by the legislatures in statutes 
addressed to particular problems, and by the bureaucracies in the 
execution of their own wills in the guise of executing the wills of 
others. 
I am not proclaiming my modesty in denying my access to 
the insights of my fellow academicians. For I do claim realism in 
the place of the philosopher's idealism. And I claim humanism 
rather than the economist's bloodless and soulless "dismal sci- 
9. G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1966). 
10. Matthew 19:30. 
11. 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
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ence."12 I can afford only judgment in the place of the sociologist's 
statistics, with a recognition that my judgment may be no better 
than his statistics. And my observations are, in the current aca- 
demic jargon, microcosmic where the political theorist's wisdom 
is macrocosmic. But you must not take my observations of the 
"brave, new wor1d"l3 that is dawning to suggest that all lawyers 
are equally limited. Many, if not most, lawyers, certainly those 
in academia, in government, and on the federal benches, make 
claims to greater insights about the social condition than even the 
greatest of philosophers, economists, sociologists, and political 
theorists. Lawyersaare, indeed, in the forefront of what was once 
called social engineering: the manipulation of individuals for 
their own benefit-individuals who are presumptively incapable 
of judging what is best for themselves-but more importantly, the 
manipulation of individuals for the benefit of a society that might 
otherwise fall afoul of the democratic principle of majority rule. 
In fact, of course, lawyers are, despite themselves, among the 
manipulated rather than among the manipulators in this 
"passing strange" and "wondrous pitiful"14 exercise. 
I would note, however, that many academic theories support- 
ing the imposition of equality of condition on the members of 
present-day American society hypothesize the equality of individ- 
uals in man's natural state, and that any existing change from the 
assumed equality of primitive man must be justified as benefiting 
the least among us. I shall not here contend with that form of 
argument, except to note that there are at  least two major diffi- 
culties with its premise. First, we are not in a primitive state and 
to analogize to it ignores that we have become more or less civi- 
lized over the millennia since men fvst formed a society. As con- 
temporary events readily demonstrate, civilization may be a very 
thin veneer. But to break through it to barbarism as an excuse 
for remodeling the contemporary human condition invites the 
dangers already too familiar to us. Moreover, as Thomas Hobbes, 
whose concepts of natural law underlie at  least some contempo- 
rary concepts of egalitarianism, said: 
[Tlhe Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, 
and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) of 
themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them 
12. T. CARLYLE, LATTER DAY PAMPHLETS 37,128 (London 1850). But see A. hcou, THe 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
13. W. SHAKESPEARE, TH TEMPEST V:1:183. 
14. W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELU) 1:3:160-61. 
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to be observed, are contrary to our natural1 Passions, that carry 
us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like.'= 
Second, there is no reason to believe that in any primitive society 
all men were equal. As T.H. Huxley once remarked: "[Tlhe 
doctrine that all men are, in any sense, or have been, a t  any time, 
free and equal, is an utterly baseless fiction."l"he future, of 
course, may be different. Recent scientific discoveries about the 
manipulation of human chromosomes, test-tube babies, and 
cloning, for example, may make possible the equality-in-fact, 
nay, the identity-in-fact, of all persons, which neither law nor 
philosophy can produce. l7 
The other major premise on which some egalitqians base 
their arguments is the idea that their theories are justified by a 
higher law, that their instincts assure them of the justice of egali- 
tarianism. As for this higher law, I would respond only in the 
words of still another egalitarian, Jeremy Bentham,18 who wrote: 
The various systems that have been formed concerning the 
standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle 
of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of 
them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for 
avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, 
and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's 
15. T. HOBBES, LEVUTHAN 139 (New American ed. 1950) (1st ed. London 1651). 
16. T.H. HUXLEY, On The Natural Ineqwzlity of Man, in METHOD AND RESULTS 313 
(1911). 
17. Another Huxley, Aldous, envisioned a society in which biological identity-in-fact 
was achieved: 
In Aldous's counter Utopia, then, human beings are deliberately bred inferior 
as well as superior; Gammas and Identical Epsilon Semi-Morons as well as 
Alpha-Pluses. The principle of mass production, as one of the World Managers 
explains, is at last applied to biology. The theme, the well-known theme of 
Brave New World, is the effect of science applied to human beings by their rulers 
a t  some approaching future point. (The theme was not the progress of science 
as such; Aldous's intention was not scientific prophecy, no foretelling of any 
probable specific technological development, such as if and when we might split 
the atom-bottled babies were just a serviceable extravagance-it was psychol- 
ogical prophecy.) The theme was that you could dominate people by social, 
educational and pharmaceutical arrangements: 
iron them into a kind of uniformity, if you were able to manipulate 
their genetic background . . . if you had a government sufficiently 
unscrupulous you could do these, things without any doubt . . . . 
And this, Aldous said in the London interview in 1961, "This was the whole idea 
of Brave New World." 
S. BEDFORD, ALDOUS HUXLEY, A BIOGRAPHY 248-49 (1974). 
18. See H. MAINE, LEC~TRES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 398-400 (7th ed. 
1914). 
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sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases [are] 
different, but the principle the same? 
Predictions-even about less pervasive egalitarianism-are 
likely to be faulty and so I pretend to none. But two decades ago, 
one of our deepest thinkers intimated that the culmination of the 
second American revolution would distort what she saw as the 
egalitarianism of labor. Problems of equality of access disappear 
when there is no shortage of the good desired to be had by all. It  
is only when scarcity compels priorities of access that equality of 
condition becomes a problem. In 1958 Hannah Arendt postulated 
that "the advent of automation . . . in a few decades probably 
will empty the [fields and] factories and liberate mankind from 
its oldest and most natural burden, the burden of laboring and 
the bondage to necessity."20 Fortunately, or unfortunately, the 
intervening years have not in fact eliminated the need for human 
labor as a conditon for the production of human goods. And so 
the question remains whether access to scarce goods should be 
allocated, a t  least in some measure, to the creators of those goods. 
But as Arendt pointed out, even the millennium, when all shall 
reap although none need sow, would provide an egalitarianism of 
no small problems. She wrote: 
The modem age has carried with it a theoretical glorification of 
labor and has resulted in a factual transformation of the whole 
of society into a laboring society. The fulfilment of the wish, 
therefore, like the fulfilment of wishes in fairy tales, comes at  a 
moment when it can only be self-defeating. It is a society of 
laborers which is about to be liberated from the fetters of labor, 
and this society does no longer know of those other higher and 
more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom 
would deserve to be won. Within this society, which is egali- 
tarian because this is labor's way of making men live together, 
there is no class left, no aristocracy of either a political or spiri- 
tual nature from which a restoration of the other capacities of 
man could start anew. Even presidents, kings, and prime minis- 
ters think of their offices in terms of a job necessary for the life 
of society, and among the intellectuals, only solitary individuals 
are left who consider what they are doing in terms of work and 
not in terms of making a living. What we are confronted with is 
the prospect of a society of laborers without labor, that is, with- 
19. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 25- 
26 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970) (1st ed. London 1780). 
20. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 4 (1958). 
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out the only activity left to them. Surely, nothing could be 
worse.*l 
Cassandra was a false prophetess not only as to the facts but 
as to their consequences. Had Arendt's laborless society come 
into existence, she wished that it would be the life of the mind 
that would replace the life of labor. But she was an intellectual, 
unprepared to acknowledge that a society might wish mindlessly 
to invest itself totally in that which it already invests its spare 
time: viewing and participating in games and entertainment. All 
that I would say here is that a pervasive egalitarianism, when 
achieved, will probably have some strange and unwanted conse- 
quences, and not the least for the intellectuals who would sponsor 
it. For the egalitarian movement-along with the presently prev- 
alent political populism-is a continuance of that  anti- 
intellectualism which has very deep roots in American society.22 
Finally, let me turn to the subject about which I pretend to 
have some knowledge, or with which a t  least I have had some 
experience. For we are repeatedly told by the courts that the 
current egalitarianism which they are helping to impose derives 
from the American Constitution. That, I think,-is arrant non- 
sense. It is not being taken from the Constitution, it  is being put 
into it. I do not mean that equality is not an important strand in 
the constitutional fabric. I would deny, however, that it is, as our 
Supreme Court and its apologists would have it, the sole or even 
the primary constitutional value. It is only one value among 
many in our basic document, and never before has it emerged as 
the dominant one. 
The notion of equality can be seen in many places in the 
constitutional text, although the word "equal" is used in the 
document only as an adjective in the fourteenth amendment's 
equal protection clause. Certainly it must be acknowledged that 
the Constitution which emerged from the Convention of 1787 was 
given in part to a reduction of privileges and disabilities that had 
attached to various classes under the English constitution. Thus, 
for example, the Constitution forbade the creation of titles of 
nobility? Citizens were, even beyond the borders of their own 
21. Id. at 4-5. 
22. R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLE~ALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (Vintage ed. 1963). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, Q 9, cl. 8: "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
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state, entitled equally to privileges and immunities of the law.24 
Religious qualifications for national office were forbidden." But 
equality was not considered a governmentally imposed condition. 
As Charles Pinckney said at  the great Convention: 
The people of the US are perhaps the most singular of any 
we are acquainted with.- among them there are fewer distinc- 
tions of fortune & less of rank; than among the inhabitants of 
any other nation.- every freeman has a right to the same pro- 
tection & security and a very moderate share of property entitles 
them to the possession of all the honors & privileges the public 
can bestow.- hence arises a greater equality, than is to be found 
among the people of any other country, and an equality which 
is more likely to continue. . . . Every member of the society 
almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving at the supreme 
offices & consequently of directing the strength & sentiments of 
the community.- none will be excluded by birth, & few by 
fortune from a power of voting for proper persons to fill the 
offices of government-the whole community will enjoy in the 
fullest sense that kind of political Liberty which consists in the 
power which the members of the state reserve to themselves of 
arriving at  the public offices, or at least of the having votes in 
the nomination of those who fill them - --26 
Pinckney was obviously referring to equality of opportunity, 
not equality of condition, to be achieved through the guarantees 
of liberty. But the functions of government in that day were con- 
siderably different from what they have become since the arrival 
of the welfare state in the 1930's. The role of government then was 
largely to provide for the common defense against the rest of the 
world and for domestic tranquility within. Of course, that domes- 
tic tranquility, like Jefferson's "pursuit of happiness, " was seen 
against the Lockean background of the sacredness of private 
property. "Life, liberty, and property"-or even the pursuit of 
happiness-denoted a different constitutional conception than 
did "liberty, equality, and fraternity," which was the banner of 
a revolution very different from the American. The French Revo- 
lution was an uprising by the deprived against the affluent. The 
States . . . ." Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, g 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . . . grant any Title of 
Nobility."). 
24. U.S. CON&. art. N, 2, cl. 1: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 3: ''[Nlo religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States," 
26. 4 J. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 1787, at 31-32 (rev. ed. 1937). 
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disparity between the rich and the poor there was unmediated by 
a middle class; there was no social mobility except through the 
sword. Equality in the French Revolution, as in the Russian Rev- 
olution, was to require the subordination, if not the elimination, 
of the upper class and the consequent raising of the lower class. 
The American Revolution, on the other hand, was a political one. 
There were not many poor in the colonies; there were equally few 
inordinately wealthy. Essentially, as Pinckney described it, we 
were already a one-class society. 
It will be remembered, however, that Pinckney spoke only of 
"Freemen" having the right to "protection & security." Slaves 
were not included and slavery was acknowledged by the Constitu- 
tion as an institution protected by the law.27 Slaves were property 
and their owners were protected in their property rights by the 
national government no less than the states. In this regard Eng- 
land was ahead of us. It was in 1772 that Lord Mansfield, in 
Somerset's Case," ruled that every man who came into England 
was entitled to the protection of the English law, whatever op- 
pression he may previously have suffered, and whatever the color 
of his skin. It was this conception of equal protection of the 
law-the same protection afforded to everyone-that found its 
way into the fourteenth amendment after the thirteenth amend- 
ment destroyed the institution of slavery. 
The fourteenth amendment by itself was no command for a 
universal equality, not even equality of rights, no less equality of 
condition. Equality before the law-the fourteenth amendment's 
proposition-had, for example, to be supplemented by additional 
constitutional provisions even before equality of suffrage could be 
effected? The consequent suffrage amendments spoke in terms 
of barring discrimination based on factors irrelevant to the exer- 
cise of the franchise. The fifteenth amendment banned disqualifi- 
cation "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi- r 
tude." The nineteenth amendment forbade disqualification "on 
account of sex." Neither race nor gender was a rational basis for 
distinguishing among those "citizens," not persons, who could 
exercise the electoral franchise. 
The fourteenth amendment also came to be read to- invali-- 
27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, Q 2, c1. 3 (fugitive slave provision). 
28. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). 
29. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 4 (1977). 
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date governmental action based on grounds irrelevant to the le- 
gitimate governmental goals to be acc~mplished.~~ b a s o n  be- 
came the test for legitimacy of government action both under the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth 
amendment. Race, religion, and gender were usually and neces- 
sarily irrelevant grounds for most governmental classifications. 
Nothing in the color of a person's skin could rationally justify 
separate treatment; few things about a person's religion could 
justify discriminatory treatment for better or'worse by the gov- 
ernment; and the biological differences between the genders can 
only rarely be rationally relevant to separate treatment by the 
government. The recognition was slow in coming that the four- 
teenth amendment allowed government to distinguish among 
persons only on the basis of factors relevant to the objective to 
be achieved. What was early recognized was that  the rights 
against discrimination that were conferred by the Constitution 
were rights of individuals, and not of the groups or classes to 
which they belonged or were assigned. 
The principal "American Dilemma," as Gunnar Myrdal ap- 
propriately labeled it,31 was the problem of discrimination against 
blacks because they were black; the new egalitarianism devel- 
oped out of attempts to solve the dilemma. Much earlier in our 
history, two esteemed savants, Jefferson and Tocqueville, told us 
that the race problem was i n s o l ~ b l e . ~ ~  And between the Recon- 
struction era and the middle of the twentieth century, little had 
been done by any branch of government to try to solve it. Segrega- 
tion of the races-separate but unequal treatment-was the rule, 
rarely by choice of both races, sometimes by choice of one, and 
sometimes, even, through the force of law. 
The evil to be abated might itself, however, be subsumed 
under a notion of equality: that  all blacks equalled all other 
blacks and all whites equalled all other whites but no black 
equalled a white and no white equalled a black. It was a concep- 
tion subversive of reason that the only significant factor in the 
measurement of a person could be the color of his skin. The result 
was a disqualification of those with black skins, regardless of their 
individual capacities, from access to education, to employment, 
to decent housing, to all those things necessary to upward mobil- 
30. Set? P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, A D THE WARREN COURT (1970). 
31. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944). 
32. 1 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 373 & n.46 (Bradley ed. New York 1945) 
(1st ed. Paris 1835). 
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ity in an open society. (It would be nice to say that this primitiv- 
ism has disappeared. But it may well be, as I shall suggest later, 
that it has simply been revised under the banner of the new 
egalitarianism .) 
From the beginning the Supreme Court had done little to 
mitigate this classification by race or color. Unlike their English 
counterparts, the American Court failed to produce an early 
Somerset decision. Indeed, it was the Supreme Court in Dred 
Scott u. S a n f ~ r d , ~  in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, that 
stamped the mark of Ishmael on the black race and helped to 
bring on the Civil War. Blacks could not, said the Court, be 
citizens or members of the American society whose rights were 
guaranteed by the Constitution because they were of an inferior 
race. The fourteenth amendment sought to right the wrong of the 
Dred Scott decision. "All persons," it said (clearly including 
blacks because "person" was the word used in the "fugitive slave 
clause"34), "born or naturalized in the United States and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside." Moreover, all persons, citizens 
or not, are protected by their entitlement to due process of law 
and the equal protection of the laws. And, as citizens, they are 
entitled to the privileges and immunities that attach to citizen- 
ship, although it has never been made clear what those privileges 
and immunities might be." 
There was, or should have been, little question that race was 
disqualified as a factor on which government could rely when 
imposing burdens or allotting benefits among its people. Due 
process of law and equal protection of the laws were both meant 
to preclude such discrimination against blacks based on their 
race. But the second American revolution, through the Supreme 
Court, captured the fourteenth amendment soon after its incep- 
tion. The origins of the amendment, to protect the emancipated 
slaves, were ignored by the Supreme Court in favor of creating a 
charter for laissez faire business competition. "Substantive due 
process," today a label of opprobrium, then was the approved 
standard, beginning with The Slaughter-House Cases3= and end- 
ing only with the reformation of the Court of the "nine old men." 
33. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 4 2, cl. 3. 
35. See Kurland, The Bivileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at 
Last"?, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OP THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 23 (J. Gerard ed. 1973). 
36. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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(We have since the Warren Court had a similar doctrine of judi- 
cial hegemony under the rubric of "substantive equal protec- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  But that is a different aspect of my story and will not be 
elaborated here.) 
Meanwhile, the Court returned to the notion that, because 
of their color, blacks were different from whites, and so long as 
the class designated black was allegedly treated equally with the 
class designated white, there was no violation of the equal protec- 
tion clause. The "separate but equal" notion of Plessy v. 
Fergusona remained dominant-never mind the fact that sepa- 
rate was never equal-until Brown v. Board .of Education3# in 
1954. 
In Brown the Court took its first step by way of judicial 
contribution, to the new egalitarian revolution of the second half 
of the twentieth century. It did not there, however, directly con- 
front the question whether governmental racial classification 
could ever be sanctioned as rational. Instead, in Brown, the Court 
simply held that education was a peculiarly important govern- 
mental function, so important that government could not preter- 
mit the joinder of races in the schoolroom. In education, it said, 
separate could not be equal-for reasons that were not very clear. 
In a companion ease, involving the schools of the District of Col- 
umbia, subject to the fifth amendment's interdictions on national 
government rather than the fourteenth amendment's limitations 
on state governments, the Court did point out the irrelevancy 
and, therefore, unconstitutionality of the racial classifi~ation.~~ 
Subsequently, in a series of unexplained summary orders, the 
Court made it clear that if "separate but equal" was invalid for 
purposes of education, it was equally invalid for transportation 
and other public fa~ilities.~' 
Had the Court stopped here to enforce its ruling, or if the 
states had proved obedient to judicial mandate, a simple and 
rational principle of equality would have evolved: No individual 
37. See Karst & Horowitz, Reitman u. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal 
h t e c t i o n ,  1967 SUP. CT. Rev. 39. 
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
39. 3q7 U.S. 483 (1954). 
40. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
41. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical 
h ' n ,  347 U.S. 971 (1954). 
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should be treated by a state differently from any other individual 
because of the difference in skin color, since skin color carries 
with it no other attribute on which a rational difference in treat- 
ment could be justified. But the Court equivocated. It did not 
order its constitutional reading to be immediately controlling 
whenever a black student asserted his right to be treated without 
regard to his color, but only that desegregation take place "with 
all deliberate speed."42 The result was that the states found recal- 
citrance profitable to their prejudices and they indulged them. 
By the time the states decided to reject school assignment on 
the basis of race, it proved too late for equality to satisfy the 
Supreme Court. That august tribunal came to insist not on a 
standard that ignored race, but on a standard based on race call- 
ing for an appropriate racial mix, i.e., an approximation in each 
school of the racial proportions in the entire school system.4J 
Thus, race, which was thought to have been abolished as a legiti- 
mate ground for governmental classification by Brown, was rein- 
troduced as a compulsory factor by the later school cases. Free- 
dom for blacks to choose their own schools was paternalistically 
rejected on the expectation that blacks really had no free will in 
this matter. 
VII 
From that point forward we have been transposing the mean- 
ing of illegal discrimination. No longer is irrationality the deter- 
minant of illegal discrimination. Almost any differential treat- 
ment, however justified in fact, is invalid, unless it concerns 
purely economic regulation, in which case any discrimination, 
rational or not, is valid. We entered the egalitarian revolution 
with a commitment to elimination of governmental bigotry and 
prejudice, based on the ground that the color of a man's skin, or 
hair, or eyes necessarily had no bearing on securing or denying the 
individual rights that  the Constitution afforded him. We are 
emerging from the egalitarian revolution with a commitment to 
a quota society, in which a person's gender, or the color of his 
skin, or his national origin, or even the sound of his named4 be- 
42. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
43. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. 
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
44. The New York Times for March 17, 1979, carried a story under the headline Job 
Hunter's Ploy: 'Bob,' No; 'Roberto, ' Si from which the following is excerpted: 
ROCKVILLE, Md., March 16-Roberto Eduardo Leon . . . [has a] new 
role as a member of an ethnic minority. 
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comes determinative of his rights. We entered the egalitarian 
revolution with the principle that individuals were to be treated 
equally with other individuals, with differences in treatment re- 
quired to be justified on relevant distinctions that did not include 
race, gender, national origin, or religion. We are emerging from 
it with a demand for equality among classes, not individuals, 
classes defined by race, gender, national origin, or religion. The 
egalitarian revolution has moved from equality to status. 
As the late Professor Alexander M. Bickel wrote: 
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and 
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for a t  
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, 
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of 
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told 
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a 
matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was 
demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found sup- 
port in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support for 
inequality under the same Constitution. Yet a racial quota dero- 
gates the human dignity and individuality of all to whom it is 
applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in practice. More- 
over, i t  can as easily be turned against those it purports to 
help. The history of the racial quota is a history of subjugation 
For until 24 days ago Roberto Eduardo Leon had for 56 years been Robert 
Edward Lee . . . . 
But Mr. Leon . . . has pecked out a niche of his own, of sorts, . . . by 
apparently becoming the first American to take a Hispanic name by legal means 
and thus seek to qualify for preferential treatment under Federal law. 
"My job with the county environmental protection agency is spotting loop- 
holes and I spotted one," Mr. Leon said candidly. 
What he had done was discern that members of minority groups are given 
preferential treatment in promotion in the Montgomery County bureaucracy. So 
with the stroke of a local judge's pen [Mr.] Lee became Senor Leon. 
Mr. Leon said he believes that his formal reclassification by the county as 
being a member of a minority group now gives him a leg up on promotion into 
three vacant county jobs a t  the supervisory level . . . . Mr. Leon contends that 
if he and the other white, male Anglo-Saxon engineers who also are applying 
for the positions are all considered by review boards to be equal in competence, 
under county law he would have to receive the position because of his new ethnic 
identification. 
A spokesman for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . 
said the Federal group was seeking to have state and county organizations 
concerned with minority rights use a person's origin rather than his surname as 
an indication of his status. 
New York Times, Mar. 17, 1979, a t  8, col. 4 (city ed.). 
The fact of the matter is, of course, that the Spanish surname is neither more nor 
less a qualification for the position in question than Mexican or Puerto Rican origins. 
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not beneficence. Its evil lies not in its name but in its effect; a 
quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the 
worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately striv- 
ing for an equality that will make race i r r e l e~an t .~~  
The new rule is not a rule of equality. It is a rule that minori- 
ties may not be treated less favorably, but they can-and must 
under some of our laws-be treated more favorably than those not 
labeled as minorities. And a minority is not to be determined by 
the size of the group, but rather by the states of mind of those 
labeled as minorities and nonminorities. Thus, our sociologist 
friends, from whom the law has borrowed its definition, told us: 
Contemporary sociologists generally define a minority as a 
group of people-differentiated from others in the same society 
by race, nationality, religion, or language-who both think of 
themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by the 
others as a differentiated group with negative connotations. Fur- 
ther, they are relatively lacking in power and hence are sub- 
jected to certain exclusions, discriminations, and other differen- 
tial treatment. The important elements in this definition are a 
set of attitudes-those of group identification from within the 
group and those of prejudices from without-and a set of behav- 
iors-those of self-segregation from within the group and those 
of discrimination and exclusion from 
While this standard has been applied by the courts to fe- 
males, although they are neither a numerical minority nor politi- 
cally powerless, it has not been equally applied to religious minor- 
ities or ethnic groups who are both numerically small and conse- 
quently politically powerless. In short, so far, there are only a 
small number of minorities thus classified that have been af- 
forded preferential treatment under the rubric of nondiscrimi- 
nation. 
The word "discriminate" once meant to distinguish among 
individuals or things on the basis of real, however subtle, differ- 
ences among them. A person of discrimination was highly re- 
garded because of his ability to distinguish the meritorious from 
the meretricious. Discrimination is no longer a word used to sug- 
gest taste and refinement; it is rather a word associated almost 
exclusively with real or imagined bigotry and boorishness. He 
who is charged with discrimination is accused of indulgix preju- 
dices that make him, in the vernacular, a "racist" or a "sexist." 
-- - -- - -- 
45. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). 
46. 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 365 (1968). 
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Whatever those words may mean, they are pejorative. A person 
making distinctions based on race or gender in order to benefit a 
protected minority, however, is not a racist or a sexist but only a 
true believer that the differences between males and females, and 
among blacks, whites, browns, and yellows, are real, never mind 
how irrelevant the racial or gender factor may be to the end to 
be achieved. Thus, the notion of the President of the United 
States that the qualifications of a nominee for appointment to a 
United States court are to be found in the color of his skin or her 
gender is neither racist nor sexist. On the other hand, a standard 
of substantive qualifications to fill such important roles would be 
both, if it did not afford the proper quota of minorities and 
women. The unfortunate consequence is that many individuals 
within the protected classes who well merit the appointments will 
be demeaningly labeled and treated as "quota" judges. 
In 1970 Daniel J. Boorstin, now the Librarian of Congress, 
wrote a satire about a hypothetical professorial thesis for the 
structuring of society according to the doctrine of "Ethnic Propor- 
tionalism," the principal tool or measure of which was to be the 
"Ethnic Quotient." The book was entitled The Sociology of the 
Absurd, with the word "absurd" turned on its head. Today, the 
book does not read as satire but as descriptive of present condi- 
tions. The preposterous has become the legal standard of behav- 
ior. Account must now be taken by courts, by legislatures, by 
executive agencies, by schools and universities, by employers, 
indeed, by almost anyone who receives money from, or pays 
money to, the national government, of what Boorstin called the 
"New Social Science to promote [the] New Demo~racy."~~ 
As Harold Rosenberg once told us: 
Bureaucracy is the social realization of the arithmetical point of 
view, that is, the point of view of the mass that is ruled. The 
sage of bureaucracy is the statistician. But counting depends on 
the existence of the single unit. Hence bureaucracy must have 
one Person as its measure. Should there be more than one, each 
would insist on his absolute difference and statistics would be- 
come impossible. 48 
47. D. BOORSTIN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ABSURD 23 (1970). In fact, Boorstin's is a tame 
version of the new egalitarianism because it is no longer to be applied to all minorities, 
but only to those singled out as worthy by the courts and the bureaucracies. And this is 
largely a distinction between classes labeled "had's" and "had not's." See also G. ORWELL, 
1984 (1949). 
48. H. &SENBERG, DISCOVERING THE PRESENT 210 (1973). 
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The individual has come to be ignored as the measure of 
equal treatment in favor of the class to which the individual is 
statistically assigned. Neither the Constitution nor the Congress 
has sponsored the new egalitarianism that demands proportion- 
ate equality among such arbitrarily defined classes. This quota 
system or caste system or status system is purely a creature d the 
courts and the bureaucracy. It is not a social policy established 
through democratic expression, pursuant to which each person 
counts for one and none counts for more than one, but rather 
through those guardians of government that must be described as 
"politically irresponsible," i. e., without responsibility to any elec- 
toral constituency for the rules and decisions that they promul- 
gate. This quota system was the standard invoked to assure that 
all protected minorities would be treated as well as all whites, not 
that individual members of those minorities would be treated as 
well as individual whites. 
The Constitution, essentially through the fourteenth amend- 
ment, calls on the majority to treat minorities as the majorities 
would treat themselves." This requirement has been perverted, 
not to require equality under law for select minorities, but to 
#ford them preferences. And the justification for the inequality 
of the new egalitarianism is that it allegedly compensates for past 
inequalities. Thus, past iniquitous irrationalities become justifi- 
cations for present iniquitous irrationalities, regardless of 
whether any particular claimant for preference has himself ever 
suffered from the earlier disabilities imposed on his race or her 
gender. 
It is one thing to say that if A has been excluded from a job 
or a place in school because he is black, and B because she is 
female, and C because he is a Seventh-Day Adventist, each of 
them should be and is now entitled by law to the place that 
should have been his were it not for his race, gender, or creed, and 
to monetary compensation for the period of deprivation. That is 
a rationally based conclusion that race, gender, and religion are 
irrelevant to qualifications for the. places involved. It is another 
thing, however, to say that one becomes entitled to a place not 
because he has been discriminated against, but simply because 
he is black, she is female, or one professes a given reIigion. The 
49. Cf. Ftailway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) ("principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be 
imposed generally"). 
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bureaucratic allocation of places in the proportion that the num- 
bers of the race, gender, or religion bear to the population as a 
whole is irrational. For there is nothing in the ratio, any more 
than there is in the skin color or gender, that establishes an indi- 
vidual's qualifications for the place, unless quotas are self- 
justifications as the new egalitarianism -seems to imply. Under 
the new egalitarianism, it is not the individual, the "person," who 
is afforded equal protection of the laws, it is rather the class, a 
self-defined minority within which each individual is the same as 
every other, that receives the constitutional protection. It is, I 
submit, one thing for Gertrude Stein to tell us: "A rose is a rose 
is a rose is a rose."50 It is another for the courts and bureaucracies 
to tell us that a black is a black is a black. 
A consequence of this new jurisprudence is the affirmation 
of a prediction made by Mr. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone many 
years ago: 
The experience of the past one hundred and fifty years has 
revealed the danger that, through judicial interpretation, the 
constitutional device for the protection of minorities from op- 
pressive majority action, may be made the means by whicfi the 
majority is subjected to the tyranny of minority. It was the 
lasting contribution of Justice Holmes that he saw clearly that 
the danger arose, not from the want of appropriate guiding for- 
mulas for the exercise of the judicial function, but from the 
judicial distrust of the democratic process, and from the innate 
tendency of the human mind to apply subjective rather than 
objective tests of the reasonableness of legislative a~ t ion .~ '  
We are heading toward an equality measured by superficial 
characteristics. We start with a patently reasoned position that 
government may not assume disparity of capacities because of a 
person's race, creed, color, national origin, or sex. But we have 
quickly moved toward a concept of status measured by exactly 
those conditions that were once condemned by constitution and 
law. We reject the notion of individuality in favor of the presump- 
tion of uniformity of all those within the once-condemned classifi- 
cations. We treat groups, not persons. All blacks, all whites, all 
Spanish-speaking, all males and females become fungible and 
their characteristics are assumed to be uniform. A black is treated 
as culturally deprived not because he is culturally deprived but 
because he is black. A white is treated as acculturated not be- 
50. G.  STEIN, An Elucidation, in PORTRAITS AND PRAYERS 261 (1934). 
51. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 331 (1956). 
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cause he is acculturated but because he is white. A black off- 
spring of the middle class is to be treated the same as a black 
offspring of the impoverished, not because their upbringing or 
condition is the same but because their color is the same. Having 
joined all blacks, and all whites, and all women, we then com- 
mand equality of condition without reference to the merits of any 
of the individuals within the group. We have thus abolished dis- 
crimination, not only in the sense of racial, religious, or other 
irrational prejudices, but in the sense of recognition of real indi- 
vidual differences. 
Finally, I would come full circle and make again the point 
that the quota society will be brought about only by the subordi- 
nation of once much-cherished values in the effort to impose 
equality upon us. The goal of the new equality was described by 
an English author in a book entitled The Danger of Equality: 
"The more nearly the citizens of a country resemble one another 
in the amount of money they spend, the goods they own, the 
education they acquire and the social deference they receive, the 
more nearly perfect will that country be."52 The means to that 
goal is the quota. It matters not for this goal that the equality 
may be achieved by reducing the highest to the lowest, by tearing 
down rather than building up. 
Essentially, my problem is not the accomplishment of this 
state of Nirvana. It is the price to be paid for it. In part, the price 
is democracy itself, for as Geoffrey Gorer wrote about the mono- 
lithic nature of the new egalitarianism: "Democracy depends on 
a multiplicity of values; if only a single value is emphasized de- 
mocracy cannot survive ."53 
My principal personal complaint about the new egalitarian- 
ism is that its goal seems to be the homogenization of the human 
race, nay, that it already assumes homogeneity as the fact. My 
creed is different. With Judge Learned Hand, I have a "faith in 
the indefectible significance of each one of us."54 I think that the 
question posed by the egalitarianism of today is "whether the 
ultimate value shall be this wistful, cloudy, errant You or I, or 
that Great Beast, Le~ ia than . "~~  And for me the choice is easy. 
52. G. GORER, THE DANGER OF EQUALITY 63 (1966). 
53. Id. at 71. 
54. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 173 (Phoenix ed. 1977). 
55. Id. at 82. 
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My colleague, Dean Karl Weintraub, put this creed better 
than I could in the introduction to his recent sterling book enti- 
tled The Value of the Individual: 
We desire to be rational men. We are made to submit and ulti- 
mately learn to submit voluntarily to the common tasks of citi- 
zenship. We wish to deal responsibly with the commonly shared 
national and worldwide problems of man. . . . We work in com- 
monly binding disciplines, and in our professional life we aim 
at  fulfillment of profc!ssional ideals. And yet, while we have 
commitments to universal human objectives . . . [we] have 
come to place a very high value on our specific uniqueness as 
individuals. We are captivated by the spectacle of all the subtle 
differences between the I and the thou. We see genuine value in 
the belief that each person has a very special human form and 
something very much his own to give to the world. We feel a 
deep need to be true to the self. . . . We may recognize the 
dangers in this fascination with individuality, since it can be so 
easily bastardized into egocentric addiction to arbitrary whim, 
into a mindless glorification of doing "one's own thing," into the 
"idiocy" (in the sense by which the Greeks spoke of idiotes) of 
seeing in surrounding social patterns the enemy rather than the 
support of each self-search. Yet we are captivated by an un- 
canny sense that each one of us constitutes one irreplaceable 
human form, and we perceive a noble life task in the cultivation 
of our individuality, our ineffable self.56 
Such an attitude does not reject the recognition that there 
are a myriad of shared attributes which properly call for invoca- 
tion of equality. But individualism can share with equality what 
equality, or a t  least the new equality, cannot or is unwilling to 
share with individualism. Individualism can tolerate, in fact de- 
pends upon, the continued existence of multiple values that the 
new egalitarianism would eliminate or substantially reduce: lib- 
erty, privacy, excellence, civility, culture. For the new egalitari- 
anism is monolithic while individualism remains pluralistic. 
By way of summary, then, invidious quotas that limit access 
to goods and positions on grounds of race, religion, gender, or 
national origin are replaced by benign quotas that assure access 
to goods and positions on grounds of race, religion, gender, or 
national origin. These so-called benign quotas are to be limited 
to benefit only chosen minorities and not, a t  least not yet, minor- 
ity religions or minorities measured by some national origins. We 
56. K. WEINTRAUB, THE VALUE OF THE INDMDUAL xii-xiii (1978). 
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have moved not from status to contract, but from status marking 
disabilities to status marking privileges. We became concerned 
not merely to reduce the privileges of those who had been afforded 
them, but to substitute new privileged classes for old ones. The 
all-but-imaginary majority class of white Anglo-Saxon Protes- 
tants are to be afforded no governmental assurance of proportion- 
ate representation. 
Certainly, equality is one of the high values in any society 
that purports to be democratic. But it ought not be the sole politi- 
cal or social value. And where it conflicts with others that are also 
necessary to a nontotalitarian state, a balance must be struck if 
freedom is not to be subverted, if the worth of the individual, of 
excellence, of civility, of privacy, of majority rule, of self- 
government are to continue to have a place. 
The old equality, as opposed to the new egalitarianism, was 
based on the recognition of the individual as the focus of constitu- 
tional protection. Thus, the most recent scholarly history of 
equality in the United States, written by the English historian 
Pole, constantly reiterates the theme of individuality. He begins 
his book by saying: 
I see egalitarian principles in the light of a Western tradition in 
which they are legitimised by a profound, not a merely perfunc- 
tory, respect for individuality, and which emphasises the dis- 
tinctions among people as well as their similarities; and I regard 
this emphasis as logically consistent with the requirements of 
the United States Constitution, more especially since the Four- 
teenth Amendment .57 
He ends his book by saying: 
The Constitution extends its protection equally to all-to every 
individual on American soil-in his or her capacity as an inde- 
pendent and irreducible individual. No constitutionally accept- 
able outcome can conflict with that obligation. It is the individ- 
ual whose rights are the object of the special solicitude of the 
Constitution and for whose protection the Republic had origi- 
nally justified its claim to independent ex i s t en~e .~~  
In between he tells us: 
The advance of equality as a principle of constitutional law 
has been based in the United States as in other Western coun- 
57. J. POLE,%E P&XJIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY x (1978). 
58. Id. at 358. 
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tries on the precept of legal and moral individualism. The indi- 
vidual, being of full age and sound mind, is held to be accounta- 
ble and responsible for his, or her own conduct, and it is each 
individual who is entitled to claim the full and unalienable 
rights of man. The individualist principle dissociates people 
from the context of family, religion, class, or race.5g 
It is not too late to turn back from the new egalitarianism to 
the old equality. It is not too late to turn back from Leviathan. 
But it soon may be. 
59. Id. at 293. 
